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SOURCES OF WATER III: INTERSTATE TRANSFERS
This paper addresses the growing imbalance between

water supply and demand on interstate rivers; a growing
pressure to make unused water available to areas of
need; the right of individual appropriators to respond
to interstate demands; and opportunities for Upper
Basin states on the Colorado River to protect future
allocations by techniques that will facilitate Upper
Basin Development.
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Carlson, Contrary Views of the Law of the Colorado
River: An Examination of Rivalries Between the
Upper and Lower Basins, 32 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst.
21.1-68 (1986)
Colby, To Market or Not to Market: Allocation of
Interstate Waters, 29 Natural Resources Journal
327 (1989)
Getches, Meeting Colorado's Water Requirements:
An Overview of the Issues, Natural Resources Law
Center (1986)
Holme, Obstacles to Interstate Transfer of Water:
Many a Slip 'twixt the Cup and the Lip, Natural
Resources Law Center (1986)
Meyers and Tarlock, Water Resource Management
(1980), pp. 382-517, Upper Colorado River
Commission 1984 Annual Report
Vranesch, Colorado Water Law, Chapter 12 (1987)
I. MARKET PRESSURES ARE CERTAIN TO RESHAPE INTERSTATE
WATER ALLOcATTONS AND TRANSFER REsTRTcTToNS.
A.

Historic allocation of interstate waters on
sovereignty criteria by equitable

apportionment or compacts are becoming
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strained where population growths and water
demands on a river system do not conform to
water allocation patterns.
B.

The 'Colorado River experience is a classic
illustration of the problem.
1.

Interbasin allocations under the 1929
Compact contemplated comparable longrange development and demands in each
basin.

2.

Article 111(a) of the compact
consequently made an equal allocation of
beneficial consumptive uses to each
basin.
I.

3.

More than 60 years of post-compact
development, disparity in basin growth
and demands, miscalculations in
aggregate supplies and potential further
reductions in presently available
supplies is straining the equal
allocation concept.
a.

As much as 2,250,000 acre-feet of
the Upper Basin's equal annual
HallocatiO0- has not yet been put to
beneficial use and as much as
1,000,000 acre-feet of allocated
water is delivered annually at the
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Lee Ferry measuring point in excess
of the Lower Basin entitlement.
(Upper Colorado River Commission
Annual Reports)
b. Lower Basin agricultural and
municipal demands have absorbed
substantially all releases of
mainstem water from Lake Mead and
Lake Powell under applicable
operating criteria, encompassing
all water not put to consumptive
use in the Upper Basin or stored in
mainstem reservoirs to meet
progressive ten-year compact
obligations.

C.

The Central Arizona Project was
authorized by the Colorado River
Basin Project Act of 1968
(43 U.S.C. S 1501) on an assumption
that its water demands would be met
in large part from Arizona's
allocated share of surplus water
from Upper Basin allocations.
Current implementation of the
Project is drawing, or will draw,
upwards of 1,000,000 acre-feet
annually from allocations to the
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Metropolitan Water District, San
Diego, and other beneficiaries
under the California Seven Party
Agreement. Selected Legal
References, Upper Colorado River
Commission (1965) at p. 353.
d.

The California Coastal Zone is
developing a critical water
shortage from (i) domestic uses
that are expanding in excess of
100,000 acre-feet per year,
(ii) replacement requirements for
water drawn to the CAP Project,
(iii) loss of historic deliveries
the Owens Valley and from Mono Lake
areas, and increasing barriers to
peripheral canal deliveries of
Northern Colorado water to meet the
Lower California needs.

4.

If projected impacts of the greenhouse
effect materially reduce the already
limited Upper Basin outflow by as much
as another 1,000,000 acre-feet per year,
the time will shortly come when further
Upper Basin beneficial uses will be
barred, the compact allocations will be
challenged on grounds of mistake,
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abandonment of Upper Basin uses, or
unforeseeable changes in river flow
conditions; and significant increases in
Colorado River outfall will be captured
by the Lower Basin on equitable
apportionment principles.
5.

Alternatively, the political impacts of
unsatisfied municipal demands in the
Coastal Zone of California may well lead
to a Congressional override of the
compact allocations and a reallocation
of a substantial share of Colorado River
water to Lower Basin beneficial
consumptive uses.

6.

With municipal and domestic prices for
Lower Basin water now running in excess
of $200 per acre-foot and Upper Basin
water values for irrigation and stock
water uses ranging from $4.00 to
$20.00 per acre-foot, market forces free
of compact limitations will lead to
water right transfers to the Lower Basin
and a material reduction in short-term
and long-term beneficial uses in the
Upper Basin.

II. LOWER BASIN NEEDS, THE PRESSURE OF MARKET FORCES
AND LONG-TERM UPPER BASIN PROTECTION MAY BE MET
-5-

IDEALISTICALLY BY THE KIND OF BALANCING PROCESS
THAT IS BEING EXPLORED ON THE COLORADO RIVER BY
THE RESOURCE CONSERVATTON GROUP ANT) OTHERS
A.

Factors supporting a free market or compact

readjustment objective:
1.

Water is a critical national resource,
generated in regions of precipitation
surpluses and demanded in regions of
non-water-related economic growth.

2.

Free market forces tend to allocate the
supply to meet the most economic uses.

3.

The value placed on water by free market
forces encourages water conservation
throughout the entire Basin and thereby
increases supplies for more intensive
uses.

4.

Were water tied to market factors and
released on a short-term basis from
marginal agricultural dependent regions,
sales and leases of compact allocations
might generate as much or more income
for the source basin than agricultural
production yields and provides
supplemental funding for long-term water
development.

B.

Factors supporting regional allocations of
water independent of market forces.
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1.

A water surplus over present levels of
beneficial consumptive use provide an
important level of security for future
growth, provide protection in drought
cycles and encourage regional economic
development.

2.

Recognized environmental and wildlife
demands necessitate levels of nonconsumptive use in areas of recreational
potential; it is unreal to confine water
allocations under III(a) of the Colorado
River Compact to consumptive uses.

3.

Lands in areas of water origin are
equitably entitled to the benefit of
water availability by reason of the
sovereign status of the source state and
the equal allocation of mainstem flow
between the basins by the terms of
Article III(a) of the Colorado River
Compact.

C.

Goals of market forces and basin of origin
interest may all be achieved in substantial
part by a cooperative program that makes
water freely deliverable on short-term
response to market forces but subject to a
reservation of reasonable quantities of water
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for long-term developments consistent with
the compact allocations.
1.

By confining transfers to leases or
deliveries of water on contract, rather
than a transfer of water rights, no
change is made in allocations, and
compact entitlements are reaffirmed in
both basins.

2.

Transfer proceedings are limited to an
alternate point of diversion, a release
of the water to the river at the
lessor's point of diversion, and
reinitiation of diversions on recall for
consumptive use in the Upper Basin.

3.

As the water right is not transferred
(but only the use of water), a strong
case can be made for avoiding
restrictions of anti-export legislation,
provided deliveries can be effected by
the Bureau of Reclamation under its
mainstem operating criteria.

D. Transfers of water available for beneficial
consumptive use in the Upper Basin, covered
by appropriations under state law, avoid the
surplus water release characterization of
Article III(e) of the Compact.'
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E.

Use of privatization procedures under
contract with the State or appropriate river
districts protect recall rights without an
interstate agreement that might trigger
compact procedures.

F.

A substantial part of the funds generated by
a program that could sell uses of water
valued at $30 per acre-foot for $200 per
acre-foot, less customary privatization
charges, would support construction of Upper
Basin storage facilities, reworking of
existing facilities presently under safety
restraints, initiation of needed
desalinization and other basin-wide water
improvement programs for both basins and
discharge defaults under many present federal
reclamation projects.

III. AN EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL LEGAL RESTRAINTS PLACED
ON TNTPRsTATE WATER TRANSFERS.
A.

Transfers of water under adjudicated rights
not covered by compact provisions.
1.

Interstate transfers of such rights was
firmly established in Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), as an
article of commerce subject to
interstate transfer protections under
the commerce clause of the United Stated
-9-

Constitution. As such, a transfer may
only be limited under the police rower
of the state if the water is needed at
the source for protection of public
health and welfare; such a limitation is
wholly inoperative so long as
(i) surplus waters exist in a river
system sufficient to meet local needs as
they arise and (ii) a right of recall
exists to return the water to the source

area if ever needed for health and
welfare at that point. See, City of R1
Paso v Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694

(1987).
B. Waters claimed by a state, as property of the
people under Article XVI, S 5 of the Colorado
Constitution, Colorado Enabling Act
authority, and Congressional ratification of
the applicable compact.
1. Article XVI, S 5 provides: The water of
every natural stream not heretofore
appropriated, within the State of
Colorado, is hereby declared to be the
property of the public, and the same is
dedicated to the use of the people of
the State, subject to appropriation as

pm
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hereinafter provided See also
C.R.S. 37-92-102.
2.

The only case to construe the
constitutional provisions to create a
right in the state Stockman v. Leddy,
55 Colo. 24 (1912), was overruled in
United States v. City and County of
Denve r , 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).

3.

Wyatt v. Larimer & Weld Trrigation Co.,
1 Colo. App. 480 (1892) rejected the
argument that the ownership of water
remains inalienable in the public, and
held that the water right passes to the
people by the first appropriation to a
beneficial use. And such rights should
be freely transferrable to the extent
permitted, following appropriation, by
applicable law. Einder li der v. La Plata

Rimen&Saarry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S.
92 (1938) is properly confined to its
facts, i.e., that the compact allocation
to the state is binding on the
appropriator.
4.

In Cascade Town v. Empire Water and
Powe r Co., 181 Fed. 1011 (D. Colo.
1910), all state waters are made

available for appropriation as private
property rights.
5.

The proprietary right of the United
States acquired through water resources
in the West by treaties of annexation,
were not transferred to the states by
enabling acts or any subsequent
legislation; the interest of the state
in any interstate stream stems only from
an equitable appointment or compact
allocation for the benefit of its
citizens.

6.

The Act of 1866 provided only
that: whenever, by priority of
possession, rights to the use of water
for mining, agricultural, manufacturing,
or other purposes are vested and
accrued, and the same are recognized and
acknowledged by the local customs, laws
and the decisions of courts, the
possessors and owners of such vested
rights shall be maintained and protected
in the same. Note that this Act went no
further than to recognize the authority
of the states to prescribe methods for
acquiring, and the characteristics of,
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water rights; it made no grant of water
rights to the state.
7.

Where courts have affirmed the right of
the state to preclude an interstate
transfer of water, other than under
police power criteria, it has been on
the basis that the water right was
appurtenant to the land under state
riparian law and could not be
transferred to other land in other
states. Hag, e.g., Hudson County water
Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).

cats
255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd

ger curium, 385 U.S. 35. See also
Pennaylvania v West Virginia, 262 U.S.
553 (1923) (prohibiting state
restrictions on the shipment of natural
gas outside the state to conserve waning
supplies for West Virginia citizens.).
8.

Where transfers of water are restricted
by state law, as to state lands within
the state as well as outside the state,
as in the case of designated basin

groundwaters, restrictions are
enforceable for the protection of the
aquifer and controlled development of
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depletable groundwater resources.
Danielson v. Kerbs A.G

tnc., 646 P.2d

363 (Cob. 1982).
C. Waters covered by interstate compacts are
allocated for initial appropriation under the
laws of the state or states to which an
allocation is made, but are thereafter freely
transferrable as property rights and articles
of commerce pursuant to the law of the
individual state and the non-discriminatory
provisions of the commerce clause of the
Federal Constitution.
1. No court has held that a compact
allocation goes beyond making a share of
interstate stream water available for

(Th
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appropriation under the laws of the
respective compacting states; compact
allocation provisions are only relevant
to cases where (iy allocated water is
first appropriated for use outside the
state, (ii) conditional water
appropriations are perfected by uses
outside the compacting states, or
(iii) an allocation is proposed for a
use other than one contemplated by the
applicable compact.

cm
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2.

Congressional ratification of compacts
has been treated as an Act of Congress,
for purpose of establishing federal
court jurisdiction; it has never been
held to make the United States a party
to the compact or to preclude Congress
from modifying compact allocations
compatibly with any overriding public
interest.

3.

Compacts can provide that allocated
waters will be charged to the state in
which the water is consumptively used;
such a provision could preclude
enlargement of a compact share of water
by interstate transfers of
appropriations. Such limitations are
only present under Colorado River
documents pertaining to distribution of
water in the Lower Basin within the
Lower Basin allocation or to a
distribution of water under the Upper
Colorado River Compact with respect to
the waters allocated to the Upper Basin.

4.

In any event, any potential
inconsistency is overridden by express
compact provisions that make user rights
under the Compact subject to the
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provisions of state laws. (Colorado
River Compact, Art. IV, S 3.)
IV. AN EVALUATION OF PRESUMED IMPEDIMENTS

TO

INTER-

BASIN TRANSFERS ON THE COLORADO RTVER.

A.

Limitations in state export statutes.
1.

C.R.S. S 37-81-101(1)(b) provides:
. . . the General Assembly hereby
declares that, for the purpose of
conserving the scarce water
resources of the state and to
thereby insure the continuing
health, welfare and safety of the
citizens of this state, it is
unlawful for any person . . . to
divert, carry or transport by
ditches, canals, pipes, conduits,
natural streams, watercourses or
other means, any of the water
resources found in this state into
any other state for use therein
without first complying with this
section and section 37-81-104.

The provision of thig section, referred to in
S 101(1)(b), is found in subsection (3) and
provides as follows:
Prior to approving an application
(for interstate water transfer), a
state engineer, groundwater
commissioner or water judge, as the
case may be, must find that:
(1) The proposed use of water
outside the state is expressly
authorized by interstate compact or
credited as a delivery to another
state pursuant to section 37-81-103
or that the proposed use of water
does not impair the ability of this
state to comply with its
obligations under any judicial
decree or interstate compact . . .
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2.

The provision of section 104, requiring
a payment of $50 per acre-foot as a
transfer charge on interstate
deliveries, was found in an opinion of
the Attorney General to be an
unconstitutional restraint on commerce.

3.

Section 103(1) imposes a collateral
limitation that may be restricted by
construction to cases where a compact
credit under section 101 would be
required for Colorado to meet its
compact obligation to the Lower Basin.
That provision states:
For the purpose of evaluating an
application made pursuant to
section 37-81-101, no water . . .
may be diverted or appropriated in
Colorado for a use which
contemplates or involves the
transportation of such water into
or through another state . . .
unless the amount of water so
diverted or appropriated and
transported through or into such
other state or states is credited
as a delivery to such other state
or states by Colorado of water to
which such other state or states
may be or claim to be entitled from
such interstate source . . . .

4.

Section 103 can be construed by its
express terms to be limited to a case
where the diversion or appropriation is
made by users outside the State of
Colorado for application to beneficial
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uses outside the state. As the state
allocation is clearly limited at a
minimum to the right to appropriate for

beneficial consumptive uses within the
state, it remains compatible with
Section 101. Any other interpretation
is believed to render it
unconstitutional under 2porhase v.
Nebrask and Texas v New Mexico

decisions.
5.

In any event, these non-export
provisions would not be a bar to
interstate transfers so long as
allocated water was available to this
state in quantities sufficient to meet
all of the state's demands for
beneficial consumptive uses from the
river system.

B. Compact provisions allocating all water in
the Colorado River system to beneficial
consumptive uses for domestic and agriculture
uses as defined in the Compact and precluding
the withholding of water from inter-basin
delivery that cannot reasonably be applied to
such uses in the source basin.
1.

Article III(e) of the Colorado River
Compact prohibits the upper division
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from withholding water which cannot
reasonably be applied to domestic and
agriculture uses.
2.

Article VIII protects present perfected
rights and provides that all other
rights to beneficial use of water in the
Colorado River system "shall be
satisfied solely from the water
apportioned to the basin in which they
are situated."

3.

Article IV limits uses for navigation
and power generation and provides that
"the provisions of this Article shall
not apply to or interfere with the
regulation and control by any state
within its boundaries of the
appropriation, use and distribution of
water.

4.

The claim made from these provisions is
that any beneficial use transferred from
one basin to the other basin will be
charged to the allocation of beneficial
consumptive use of the receiving basin.
The consequence would be that, by
agreement, the states would have
precluded all transfers of vested
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appropriative rights from one basin to
the other.
5.

The response is three-fold. First of
an t the compact is making water
allocations to the states for
appropriation by the residents of each
state in accordance with state law.
Secondly, no changes in those
allocations can be made by
appropriations of residents of one basin
of sources of supply in another basin
for storage and. delivery for initial
beneficial uses in the receiving basin.
Finally, a compact precludes withholding
water in storage for a generation of
power whenever such water is needed for
agricultural and domestic uses in the
other basin within or outside the
allocations made by the compact.
Nothing in the compact expressly or by
implication precludes the transfer of
private water rights that have vested
under applicable state laws. Nothing in
the compact precludes the application of
the commerce clause to transfers of
vested rights in interstate commerce
where the rights are freely
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transferrable within the source state
and where the transfer does not in any
way preclude the source state from
meeting its delivery obligations under
Article III(d) of the Compact.
Moreover, when allocated water has been
appropriated it becomes water that can
reasonably be applied to domestic and
agriculture uses within the language of
Article III(e) and can be withheld or
transferred in accordance with the law
of the state in which the appropriation
is made. The compact provisions only
mean that water supplies covered by
lease agreements must be appropriated
water freely transferrable under state
law.
C.

Regarding restrictions contained in documents
characterized as the Law of the River.
1.

Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C.
S 617(c) (1928) establishing an
allocation between Arizona, Nevada, and
California to the 7.5 million acre-feet
annually apportioned to the Lower Basin
by the compact plus a division between
Arizona and California "of the excess or
surplus waters unapportioned by the
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Colorado River Compact;" and S 617(e)
limiting storage in river reservoirs to
river regulation, improvement of
navigation, irrigation and domestic uses
pursuant to Article VIII of the Colorado
River Compact and, finally, for power.
a.

It is contended that these
provisions allocate all mainstem
water in the Colorado River below
Lee Ferry, regardless of its
source, and limit deliveries to
contracts made to implement the
provisions of the Act.

b.

The response is that the Act is
only addressing waters allocated to
the Lower Basin by compact
provisions and to surplus water in
the river not allocated by the
provisions of the compact itself.
Although in practice the latter has
been employed to divide the water
of the Upper Basin that is not
being consumed in that basin, such
water is not "surplus" water within
the meaning of Article III(f) and
(g) of the Compact and, in any
event, does not encompass water
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available for reasonable beneficial
use in the Upper Basin and
transferred by lease or contract
for Lower Basin use independent of
compact allocations.
2.

California Self-Limitation Act and Seven
Party Agreement, each containing
language defining and limiting uses of
California and agencies within
California to the waters allocated to
the Lower Basin or waters surplus and
unapportioned by the compact. Neither
in language nor context do such
provisions purport to apply to waters
allocated to the Upper Basin, available
for beneficial use in that basin and
transferred to Lower Basin uses pursuant
to provisions of state law.

3.

The decree in Arizona v California,
376 U.S. 740 (1964).
a.

The decree makes allocations among
the Lower Basin states and contains
a number of provisions relating to
the administration of mainstem
flows. For instance,
paragraph I.B.(4) provides that
"any mainstream water consumptively
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used within a state shall be
charged to its apportionment,

cm

regardless of the purpose for which
it was released." section I.B(b)
provides that "mainstem water shall
be released or delivered to water
users . . . in Arizona, California
and Nevada only pursuant to valid
contracts therefor made with such
users by the Secretary of the
Interior pursuant to Section 5 of
the Boulder Canyon Project Act or
any other applicable federal
statute. The decree further
enjoins the three states and
various California water users from
consuming or purporting to
authorize the consumptive use of
water from the mainstream in excess
of quantities permitted under
Article II of this decree.
b. The contention is that this decree,
by its express terms, establishes a
management regime on the river that
precludes any mainstream water
deliveries without chargeability
pursuant to the Boulder Canyon

-24-
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Project Act or contractual
arrangements prescribed for
mainstem water delivery.

C.

The response is that the Arizona v.
CaliforniA case was limited in

scope to management of compact
deliveries throughout the Lower
Basin and does not contain either
express or implied language that
would preclude delivery for
beneficial use in any of the Lower
Basin states of water apportioned
to the Upper Basin, appropriated
under the laws of Upper Basin
states and transferred for
beneficial use to the Lower Basin
pursuant to transfer procedures
approved by such laws.
4.

The Colorado River Storage Project Act
of 1956.
a.

This Act authorized construction,
under federal financing programs,
of various mainstem reservoirs and
participating projects for the
stated purpose of regulating the
flow of the Colorado River and
making it possible for the states

-25-

in the Upper Basin to utilize the
apportionments made to and among
them by the Colorado River Compact;
it further directed the Secretary
to comply with the Law of the River
documents for the storage and
release of water from reservoirs in
the Colorado River Basin.
Section 620(c) provides that "all
units and participating projects
shall be subject to the
apportionments of the use of water
between the Upper and Lower Basins
of the Colorado River and among the
states of the Upper Basin pursuant
to the Colorado River Compact and
the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact, respectively . . . ."
b.

It is contended that this Act
impresses Congressional management
on the storage and delivery of
water throughout the mainstem
system of the Colorado River and
precludes transfers of any waters
through the system without specific
Congressional authorization.

-26-
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c.

This issue must be viewed in
conjunction with the Colorado River
Basin Project Act of 1968
authorizing the construction of the
Central Arizona Project and further
participating projects, and
establishing a management program
for the mainstream reservoirs.
Section 602(a) directs the
Secretary to "propose criteria for
the long-range operation of the
reservoirs constructed and operated
under authority of the Colorado
River Storage Project Act, the
Boulder Canyon Project Act and the
Boulder Canyon Project Adjustment
Act. Section 203 of the Act
expressly contemplates importations
of water into the Colorado River
system from sources outside the
natural drainage area. In that
context the Congress has dropped
management provisions that could be
construed to limit the operating
criteria and mainstem reservoirs
storage and contract delivery only
of allocated Lower Basin Water.

-27-

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF LEASING PROGRAM WILL REQUIRE
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SELECTION OF WATER TRANSFERABLE UNDER STATE LAW
UNDER BUREAU OF RECLAMATION OR RIVER DISTRICT
PROSCRIPTIONS, ESTABLISHING A PROCEDURE CONSISTENT
WITH THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION POLICY OF DECEMBER,
1988 TO OPTIMIZE BENEFICIAL USE OF PROJECT AND
OTHER WATERS BY FACILITATING THEIR TRANSFER TO
POINTS OF NEED AND SATISFACTORY PURSUIT OF STATE
PROCEEDINGS FOR QUANTIFYING WATERS TRANSFERRED OR
EXCHANGED IN USE AND MEASURING EVAPORATION AND
TRANSPORTATTON LOSSFS IN TRANSIT.

A.

These procedures are substantially similar to
those employed in effecting changes in place
and character of use of water within a state
system, modified only in the call for
interstate cooperation in the Upper Basin
pursuant to the terms of the Upper Basin
Compact and management of deliveries by the
state engineers and Bureau of Reclamation
personnel.

B.

The procedure is significantly simplified by
a leasing arrangement through which the
supplier only closes his headgate pursuant to
administrative or judicial order and
addresses state and federal measurement
criteria between the point of diversion and
the place for downstream delivery.

-28-
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C.

Recall is effected by notice and initiation
of diversions at the old or altered diversion
point in the Upper Basin.

VI. A PRIVATIZATION CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT APPEARS TO
BE THE PREFERRED COURSE TO IMPLEMENT AN INTERBASTN TRANSFER PROGRAM IN THAT:
A.

The states do not have the capacity to make
or administer necessary delivery
arrangements.
1.

Any agreement the state might make with
a Lower Basin state relating to recall
of water or the preservation of Upper
Basin allocations would have compact
characteristics and might well require
modification of the Colorado River
Compact or approval of supplemental
agreements by the Congress.

2.

If individual states got into
competition with one another in the
management and delivery of water,
frictions would likely break down the
viability of the whole program.

3.

If the Upper Basin states enter into a
cooperative arrangement to make water
available from each of the states to
serve a Lower Basin need, a compact
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relationship would likely arise and
necessitate Congressional ratification.
B. Lower Basin entities might proceed directly
to gain leases on valid existing rights and
arrange for the transfer of the water to
Lower Basin use.
1.

Any such entity would have to address
each individual water transfer in a
separate administrative or court
proceeding, incur significant delay and
cost of implementation and likely create
political opposition within the source
states.

2.

Most significantly, however, the
acquisition of an Upper Basin right
directly by a Lower Basin user,
particularly if the right had not
enjoyed a long-standing Upper Basin use,
could well be construed as the
acquisition of allocated Upper Basin
water for Lower Basin use and incur a
charge against the compact allocation to
the Lower Basin.

C.

The privatization arrangement, with
participation from each of the supplying
states, can provide flexibility in generation
of source water, facilitate cycling of
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agricultural demands and make the program a
cooperative basin-wide endeavor.
D. Most importantly, such arrangement would seem
to avoid challenges to the compacts and the
compact allocations due to unforeseen changes
in water development and demand and to a
consensual arrangement to build an ongoing
case against potential claims of abandonment
of compact allocations.
Although we have focused on the Colorado River
Basin as a live area for interstate and inter-basin
programming, the need for supply-and-demand balance
exists throughout the west; and precedents set from
Colorado River Basin transfers are likely to guide
similar programs on other river systems within the next
decade. Change is on the threshold; it is incumbent
upon the states and knowledgeable water counsellors
(i) to shape a program that will permit critical market
demands to be met compatibly with the protection of
long-term allocations for future development in watersufficient areas and (ii) to utilize a program of this
kind to fund conservation and use programs with the
market revenues that can be generated for that purpose.
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